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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
Time: 2:35 am
Time: 2:35 am
Results for gold smuggling
2 results foundAuthor: de Koning, Ruben Title: Striking Gold: How M23 and its Allies are Infiltrating Congo's Gold Trade Summary: The M23 rebel group has taken over a profitable part of the conflict gold trade in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or DRC. It is using revenues from the illicit trade to benefit its leaders and supporters and fund its military campaign by building military alliances and networks with other armed groups that control territory around gold mines and by smuggling gold through Uganda and Burundi. M23 commander Sultani Makenga, who is also allegedly one of the rebels' main recruiters of child soldiers according to the U.N. Group of Experts on Congo, is at the center of the conflict gold efforts. This report documents how Makenga and his former co-commander Bosco Ntaganda have led the M23 rebels to work with local armed groups in gold-rich territories to smuggle gold to Uganda via an M23-controlled border crossing, as well as to Burundi, where it is sold internationally. Much of this conflict gold then reaches markets in the United Arab Emirates, or UAE, before going on to banks and jewelers, which together make up 80 percent of global gold demand. Gold is now the most important conflict mineral in eastern Congo, with at least 12 tons worth roughly $500 million smuggled out of the east every year. The other main sources of revenue for armed groups - the "3T minerals" of tin, tungsten, and tantalum - have been steadily reduced due to global conflict-minerals reforms spurred by the U.S. Dodd-Frank financial regulation law, but it is still relatively easy to smuggle gold. Limiting gold smuggling from eastern Congo must therefore become a priority for the international community. M23 commander Makenga is taking over a gold-smuggling network that former cocommander Bosco Ntaganda built over several years. As military leader of the rebel National Congress for the Defense of the People, or CNDP, a forerunner of M23, Ntaganda in 2011 reportedly brokered several multimillion-dollar gold deals in Goma, DRC; Kampala, Uganda; and Nairobi, Kenya, between Congolese traders and overseas buyers. In 2012, Ntaganda led the newly created M23 as it broke away from the Congolese army, in which its troops had been integrated as part of a peace deal. During his time with M23 and in the shadow of the peace talks in Kampala between Congo's government and the M23, Ntaganda facilitated the transfer of an estimated 325 kilos of gold worth $15 million to Kampala for sale, according to the U.N. experts. Ntaganda admitted to the U.N. experts that he played a role in one deal in 2011 in Goma, but he never commented on his role in other deals he allegedly brokered. In March 2013, Ntaganda surrendered to the U.S. Embassy in Rwanda, where he requested to transfer to the International Criminal Court, or ICC, to face charges of war crimes. Since then, Enough Project's investigations with gold-trade insiders, Congolese civil and military authorities, and members of the Congolese diaspora communities in Kampala and Bujumbura show that Makenga is taking over Ntaganda's relationships with smugglers in Uganda. Makenga has also mobilized several other military and business players loyal to former CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda to create a business network entirely separate from Ntaganda, according to Enough Project investigations. To capture a greater share of the gold trade, M23 has built alliances with individuals and armed groups that control large mines in eastern Congo. These include Sheka Ntabo Ntaberi of the Nduma Defence of Congo, or NDC, armed group in Walikale territory of eastern Congo - the alleged mastermind of the mass rape of more than 300 women, children, and men at Luvungi in 2010. M23 has built ties with Justin Banaloki - whose alias is "Cobra Matata" - the armed leader who is based in Ituri District and was highlighted in the October 2013 National Geographic. M23 is also associated with Congolese army defector and militia leader Maj. Hilaire Kombi in Beni and Lubero territories, according to U.N. experts and Enough Project research. Traversing otherwise hostile ethnic and political divisions, these alliances are based partially on economic gain. Many of those who reap the greatest profits are also those most directly implicated in atrocities and crimes against humanity. On the basis of recent Enough Project investigations and past research by the U.N. Group of Experts, this report identifies three main gold exporters that the Enough Project believes are enabling M23 and associated armed groups to profit from the gold trade by either running or using official gold export companies in Uganda and Burund - all of which is in violation of the U.N. arms embargo: - Rajendra "Raju" Kumar, who currently trades through Mineral Impex Uganda and formerly ran Machanga, Ltd. - Mutoka Ruganyira, who currently operates through Ntahangwa Mining in Burundi and formerly ran Berkenrode - Madadali Sultanali Pirani, who currently runs Silver Minerals in Uganda Additionally, a major Congolese exporter has reportedly been trading gold from mines controlled by the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, or FDLR, and other armed groups for several years, according to several U.N. Groups of Experts: - Evariste Shamamba, who currently runs Etablissement Namukaya and New CongoCom Airlines16 The international community has done very little to combat the sale of conflict gold effectively. None of the above-mentioned individuals, or the companies they currently run, face U.N., U.S., or E.U. sanctions. The only international sanctions against conflict gold companies were enacted in 2007, but the owners of the sanctioned companies immediately set up new gold-exporting businesses under different corporate names. Sanctions against the four exporters would make an important dent in the conflict gold trade, since they control a significant portion of the illicit trade. Gold exporters generally claim to purchase their gold either domestically or in countries that are not under a U.N. arms embargo. The fact that a significant part of conflict gold trade enters the formal worldwide gold trade shows an urgent need to levy targeted international sanctions on the individual exporters - the beneficial owners of these businesses - who are complicit. In order to conduct and facilitate due diligence following guidelines established by the United Nations and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, or OECD, the international community should intensify pressure on companies, company owners, and their host governments that are importing and refining gold from the region. While such sanctions are important to bring the illicit gold trade under control and further reduce sources of revenue for armed groups, the agony of eastern Congo will ultimately end when the key parties - Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda - reach a just, comprehensive peace agreement. The best hope for that is the process led by U.N. Special Envoy Mary Robinson, following the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework signed earlier this year. Details: Enough Project, 2013. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 19, 2016 at: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/StrikingGold-M23-and-Allies-Infiltrating-Congo-Gold-Trade.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Congo, Democratic Republic URL: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/StrikingGold-M23-and-Allies-Infiltrating-Congo-Gold-Trade.pdf Shelf Number: 140353 Keywords: Conflict MineralsGold MiningGold SmugglingIllegal TradeIllicit TradeNatural ResourcesSmuggling |
Author: Partnership Africa Canada Title: Contraband Gold in the Great Lakes Region: In-region Cross-border Gold Flows versus Out-region Smuggling Summary: This study examines the ASM gold sector in the ICGLR Region, analysing both its size and the extent to which ASM gold produced in the region is smuggled either across local borders or out the region completely. The study notes the extent to which cross-border movement of gold within the ICGLR region now pales in comparison to the volume of ASM gold that is smuggled out of the region and exported illegally, principally to the United Arab Emirates. This result should be of particular interest to governments of ICGLR nations, who have traditionally looked on the problem of contraband gold as a primarily DRC related issue. With its linkages to conflict financing, gold smuggling from the DRC remains perhaps the most acute problem. However, for the governments of all other producer nations in the IGCLR region the vast scale of ASM gold smuggling from the region represents a clear and pressing problem. At its most basic level, the smuggling of ASM gold deprives governments of the region of tax revenue - up to $22 million per year - desperately needed for development. Beyond the financial loss, the inability of IGGLR governments to control, tax and financially benefit from their ASM gold sectors has served to distort governance of the mineral sector in the ICGLR region. While the LSM sector provides relatively little employment in comparison to the ASM sector, governments in the ICGLR region give priority to LSM gold projects, in large measure because LSM projects provide actual tax revenue to state coffers. Regaining control of ASM gold exports would not only serve to curtail conflict in the DRC, but could also serve to rebalance government priorities in the gold mining sector. Alongside the LSM sector, the ASM sector could take its proper role as a significant generator of employment, and a moderate generator of tax revenue for African governments. At the other end of the chain, the study examined the role played of the United Arab Emirates (Dubai) in the commercialisation of illegally exported ASM gold from the ICGLR region. The study found that responsibility for the failure to effectively control ASM gold flows from the ICGLR region rested not only with the producing countries, but also with the actors in the major destination for ASM gold from the ICGLR Region, the United Arab Emirates. The study found few if any effective controls being implemented by the UAE at the purchasing level of the chain: customs and import controls are lax, buyers in the souk pay little attention to origin or legal provenance, refiners and banks do not have systems in place to assure the legal provenance of the gold they trade in. This collective failure at the purchasing level is all the more extraordinary, given that due diligence as defined by the OECD (and accepted by the UAE), is the responsibility not only of producer-state governments but of actors all along the supply chain; producers, intermediaries, traders, refiners, financers/bankers and end-users. If they truly want to remain compliant with due diligence as defined by the OECD, bankers, traders and governments at the purchasing level will have to begin being much more stringent in their KYC and documentation requirements for ASM gold and gold-related transactions. Finally, the study provides suggestions and potential solutions, both for producer states and for purchasing nations such as the UAE: technical measures that, if implemented, would significantly strengthen due diligence and reduce the volumes of ASM gold being smuggled out of the ICGLR region. Details: Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada, 2015. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 19, 2016 at: http://cosoc-gl.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/2015_05_Great_Lakes_Contraband_Gold.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Africa URL: http://cosoc-gl.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/2015_05_Great_Lakes_Contraband_Gold.pdf Shelf Number: 140362 Keywords: Gold MiningGold SmugglingIllegal TradeNatural Resources |